This book is the story of the end of the Cold War starting from approximately the last days of Brezhnev in the Soviet Union up to the fall of Gorbachev in 1991. It provides the reader with useful insights into the thinking of both Gorbachev from the Soviet side and firstly Ronald Reagan and then George Bush senior from the American side.

It provided a thoughtful insight into how much Gorbachev and Reagan were both leaders acting outside the dominant mindset or frame of reference in their respective governments, and how much there own personal beliefs and values made the succesful and safe winding down of the Cold War possible. It also explained the logistics and planning that went into the concept of retaliatory nuclear strike – the dead hand of the title, that is to say that even if the Soviet leadership in Moscow was wiped out a semi-automated response would be possible.

The argument of the book is that Gorbachev tried to play off rival reform and hardline factions and that his failure to embrace democracy led to his downfall. I thought this was a harsh judgement given the nature of Soviet power and rule and that it was Gorbachev who made democratisation possible.

The book also fails to draw out the failures of the Bush and Clinton administrations to make the most of the opportunities presented by the end of the Cold War, it references the timidity and caution of US policy makers in relation to Russia but not the obvious consequences of today as seen in the sliloviki regime of Putin.

One failing of the book was the obsession with detailing the Soviet biological weapons program – it occupied a substantial portion of the book but was out of place in the context of the broader discussion of nuclear arms control -probably a 3rd of the book was taken up with this topic.